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ABSTRACT
This article responds to Staricco’s critique of cultural political economy
(CPE) for being inherently constructivist because of its emphasis on the
ontologically foundational role of semiosis (sense- and meaning-making)
in social life. Staricco recommends the Amsterdam School of
transnational historical materialism as a more immediately productive
and insightful approach to developing a regulationist critique of political
economy. Both lines of criticism of CPE are addressed. First, Staricco
misinterprets the implications of treating semiosis and structuration as
ontologically equal bases of social life. Second, Staricco mistakes our
criticisms of the ‘Italian School’ in international political economy for
criticisms of the Amsterdam School – an approach we have always
warmly endorsed. He therefore misses our more nuanced claim that
while the Amsterdam School emphasises the importance of semiosis, it
has fewer concepts to explain how semiosis matters and why only some
imagined class identities and concepts of control are selected, retained,
and institutionalised. CPE addresses this lacuna by integrating critical
semiotic analysis into political economy. Third, we provide the first
detailed comparison of the Amsterdam School and CPE to provide a
better understanding of the merits of each approach and to indicate
where they might complement each other without claiming one to be
superior to the other.
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We thank Juan Ignacio Staricco for his generous evaluation of our cultural political economy (CPE)
project. We reciprocate by commending his theoretically informed, methodologically sophisticated,
and empirically rich doctoral dissertation on the sectoral accumulation regime and mode of regu-
lation of the Argentinian wine industry, which focuses on Fair Trade discourses and practices (Staricco
2015). In his article in this journal, Staricco endorses our rejection of Bas van Heur’s critique in New
Political Economy of CPE, which charged that it ignores the critical potential of constructivism in pol-
itical economy (Jessop and Sum 2010, van Heur 2010). This was because, for van Heur, CPE prioritises
structure over agency, materiality over semiosis, and hard political economy over soft economic soci-
ology. Staricco inverts this critique. He suggests that the most novel and distinctive element of CPE,
its ontological cultural turn, is too constructivist. CPE should not be ‘blamed for… remaining too
economistic, but exactly the contrary: [for] the risky culturalist tendencies that it engenders’ (Staricco
2016: 2, cf. 9–10).1 Culturalism denotes here ‘the reduction of all social (economic) facts to culture’ – a
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reduction that leads culturalists to deny ‘the specificity of economic social relations and their con-
straints and opportunities’ (Staricco 2015: 330, 2016: 1, cf. Sum and Jessop 2013: 177–83, 468). Cul-
turalism, therefore, neglects the key material features of capitalist economies or societies. In our
case, this danger stems, he argues, without noting the paradox, from our granting of equal ontologi-
cal status to semiosis and structures (2016: 7). This nullifies our alleged attempt to transcend the
Amsterdam Project of transnational historical materialism, which, for Staricco, provides a more prom-
ising route to advancing critical political economy by building on the achievements and overcoming
the limitations of the Parisian regulation approach (RA). Its three key advances in this regard comprise
(1) a stronger account of agency; (2) attention to ‘the fundamental role of consciousness, ideology
and culture in the regulation and transformation of social formations’; and (3) a global perspective
that rejects an alleged Parisian naturalisation of nation states and the national scale (Staricco 2016:
10).2 Readers familiar with our work will not be surprised that we reject Staricco’s suggestion that
we are closet constructivists as robustly as we previously refuted van Heur’s charge of overt structur-
alism. These mirror-image criticisms stem from equally profound misreadings of our work. As these
occur elsewhere, we use this reply to clarify the CPE project and the role of our 2013 book in advan-
cing this project.
Gramsci on critique
Gramsci has inspired both the CPE and Amsterdam projects. His views on critique also inform our
contributions to state theory, the RA, critical discourse analysis, cultural economy, and so forth (cf.
Jessop and Sum 2016). In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci suggested some important protocols for a
philological critique of elaborate theoretical systems or conceptions of the world. First, it should
seek their ‘essential coherence’ by locating them ‘in the whole development of an author’s multiform
intellectual work’. In this regard, ‘the essential aspects comprise those elements in the process of a
thinker’s intellectual development that have become stable and “permanent” and made part of his
own thought, distinct from and superior to the “material” that had stimulated his reflections’. It is
important to distinguish between these elements and ‘discards’ that the author only experimented
with for a time. The search for the Leitmotiv, for the developing rhythm of thought, should therefore
be more important than looking for casual affirmations and isolated aphorisms. Second, this task
must be undertaken with ‘the most scrupulous accuracy, scientific honesty and intellectual loyalty
and without any preconceptions, apriorism or parti pris’ (Gramsci 1971: 382–6).
In contrast to Staricco’s careful assessment of the Amsterdam Project (2015: 59–73), his critique of
CPE does not satisfy these criteria. First, rather than looking for the essential coherence of the CPE
approach as it has developed in its authors’ multiform intellectual work over 25-plus years, he
seeks to show its essential incoherence by resorting to a one-sided reading that ignores CPE’s endur-
ing concern to avoid not only a constructivist or culturalist ‘soft economic sociology’, but also a (nat-
uralistic) materialist ‘hard political economy’ (on the latter, see also van der Pijl 2012: 29). Second, parti
pris pervades the criticism, reflecting Staricco’s goal of proving that the Amsterdam Project is far
better placed to realise the theoretical potential of the RA. This was the case that he quite legitimately
advanced in his thesis vis-à-vis Anglo-Saxon cultural studies, without mentioning CPE even once in
this or any other context (2015: 333). Had he done so, he would have seen that we share his critique,
having included cultural studies in our critique of ‘soft cultural economics’ or ‘soft economic soci-
ology’ (Jessop and Sum 2006a: 177–83, 468). In his article, however, he substitutes CPE for cultural
studies in his plea on behalf of the Amsterdam School, mentioning Anglo-Saxon cultural studies
only once, in the opening paragraph, which is taken verbatim from his thesis. To make his case
against CPE, he takes arguments out of context and out of time; attributes statements to us that
we did not make (even citing page numbers for them);3 collapses or conflates crucial conceptual
CPE distinctions; acknowledges but does not engage with CPE’s distinctive concepts for analysing
political economy (as opposed to those for analysing semiosis); focuses instead on its more
general arguments about the role of semiosis in the co-constitution of all social relations; does not
2 B. JESSOP AND N.-L. SUM
distinguish stable and permanent elements from discards; ignores the organic relation between argu-
ments developed in our prior work on the state and the RA and the new CPE research agenda; and,
hence, the complementarity between arguments in different phases of our work. This leads him to
exaggerate the differences between CPE and Amsterdam approaches and ignore similarities in
their genesis, development, core concepts, and explanatory strategies. This follows from his
strange decision to use CPE as the foil for highlighting the superior qualities of the Amsterdam
School rather than retaining Anglo-Saxon cultural studies for this purpose.
Staricco’s critique
Staricco’s criticisms can be distilled into nine core arguments:
(1) while semiosis must be taken seriously, as CPE proposes, this leads CPE to underestimate the objec-
tive nature of social relations [of production], their inherent contradictions, and effects (4, 7, 8);
(2) CPE denies that social relations of production, accumulation regimes, and crises exist indepen-
dently of the will of social actors, their symbolic construction, and their interpretation (7);
(3) Because it does not consider class divisions to be important and classes lose their explanatory
power, CPE cannot show or explain the relation between classes and economic imaginaries
and can only explore their class relevance (7–8);
(4) CPE’s emphasis on the performative role of economic imaginaries in constituting economic
regimes displays a culturalist bias (5, 7);
(5) CPE lacks clear concepts for analysing the structural dimensions of the capitalist economy and
therefore considers the economic only as the context in which semiosis operates (6–7);
(6) a fortiori, CPE cannot explain the objective roots of economic crisis in capital’s inherent structural
contradictions or explain what distinguishes ‘organic’ from ‘arbitrary’ imaginaries, strategies, and
projects in the economic field (6–7);
(7) CPE does not try to explain how crises are objectively overdetermined through capital’s structural
contradictions but focuses on their subjective indeterminacy, thereby privileging actors’ con-
struals over valid scientific explanations (14–15);
(8) CPE offers a valid critique of the Parisian School’s residual economism but extends this unfairly to
the West German and Amsterdam Schools, which have developed useful concepts for a more
balanced analysis (3, 12); and
(9) with its unified focus on class relations, class interests and class strategies, the Amsterdam Project
provides a better entry-point for critical political economy than CPE’s hierarchical privileging of
semiosis over structuration (7–9, 10–12).
Based on these criticisms, Staricco argues that CPE could best contribute to critical political
economy by confining its ambitious effort to ‘put culture in its place in political economy’ by round-
ing out the scientifically superior work of the Amsterdam School. Specifically, its special role would be
to illuminate ‘the fundamental role of consciousness, ideology and culture in the regulation and
transformation of social formations’ by ‘exploring discourses and their articulation, meaning-
making and struggles for hegemony’ (2016: 20). In turn, CPE would benefit from recognising, in
line with the Amsterdam School, ‘the objectivity of social structures and relations that do not need
to be (re)signified to have consequences and produce effects’ (2016: 10).
A CPE response
We cannot address all nine criticisms here. We therefore focus on the most important and indicate
how we would respond to the rest. We begin with criticism one. As Staricco acknowledges, the
most distinctive feature of CPE in relation to critical political economy is, of course, its ontological cul-
tural turn. We would add that its most distinctive feature in relation to critical semiotic analysis is its
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adoption of an evolutionary approach to the variation, selection, and retention of imaginaries and its
insistence on the always-already semiotic nature of social relations in the field of political economy as
elsewhere (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008: 1155–6). These two features inform its claim to mark a
rupture in the development of the RA. This does not mean that we reduce reality to semiosis. For,
while an ontological cultural turn affirms the foundational role of sense- and meaning-making for
all social actions, social relations are also fundamentally shaped by structuration. Staricco acknowl-
edges this when he criticises the equal ontological status that CPE gives to semiosis and structuration
(2016: 7), but then ignores its important corollaries. These include, for example, that ‘[w]hile a CPE
analysis could start either with identities and interests or with contradictions and antagonisms, the
interconnections among these alternative starting points mean that, sooner or later, these intercon-
nections must come to the analytical foreground’ (Sum and Jessop 2013: 187, emphasis in the orig-
inal). This point applies more generally for semiosis or structuration as alternative starting points in
theoretical or empirical analyses. In contrast, Staricco concludes that starting with semiosis commits
us to an ontological hierarchy that necessarily privileges semiosis over materiality (2016: 10). For us,
starting with semiosis is no more, but no less, than a contingent epistemic choice between two
options and does not entail a fixed ontological ordering. This error is compounded by Staricco’s recur-
rent (but not fully consistent) equation of semiosis with the symbolic or cultural and by his neglect of
our dialectically informed comments on the material dimensions of semiosis as well as the semiotic
aspects of materiality (Sum and Jessop 2013: 156–7). These points are central to the critical realist,
strategic-relational approach that provides the Leitmotiv in all our work, including the development
of CPE.
The equal ontological status accorded to semiosis and structuration entails alternative but comp-
lementary approaches to analysing their co-constitutive role in different contexts. This point is
especially important given the main purpose of the CPE book. This is to develop a ‘grand theoretical’
analysis of semiosis that complements the analyses of the state and political economy developed in
State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place in Political Economy (1990) and Beyond the Regu-
lation Approach: Putting Capitalist Economies in their Place (2005). The CPE monograph is not subtitled
Putting Capitalist Culture in its Place in Political Economy, but Putting Culture in its Place in Political
Economy. This reflects the two aims that motivated its writing and shaped its structure. Our first
goal was to offer a critique of prior institutional and cultural turns in political economy and, thus
equipped, to present an approach to semiotic analysis that, compared with these efforts, is also
fully compatible with critical political economy. This is the ambitious ‘grand theoretical’ project pre-
sented in Parts I and II, which comprise the first half of our text (on grand theory, see Sum and Jessop
2013: 98–101). It explains why semiosis is the privileged starting point in the first half of the book and
why issues of materiality enter therein mainly in the form of context, mediations, and consequences.
It might also explain why Staricco concluded, wrongly, in his fifth criticism, that, for CPE, materiality
and extra-semiotic factors ‘become relevant only as elements that condition or shape semiotic pro-
cesses… [and] do not seem of relevance as objects of study in their own [right]’ (2016: 6, 7).
However, this order of presentation does not entail a theoretical commitment to the primacy of
semiosis over structuration. It merely reflects the stated aims and objectives of the third book in
what comprises, we maintain, an essentially coherent trilogy unified by shared meta-theoretical
premises.
Our second self-defined task was less novel in theoretical terms, because it drew substantially on
our previous work, and was more modest in scope. This was to present commensurable semiotic and
structural concepts appropriate to a post-disciplinary CPE (as opposed to other social scientific fields)
that can be applied at various steps in the movement from abstract-simple to concrete-complex
objects of inquiry (on this movement and its Marxian roots, see Jessop and Sum 2006a: 18, 302–
10, 376, Staricco 2015: 88–92). It also elaborates themes outlined in the book’s first half about tech-
nological and agential selectivities and how they interact with discursive and structural selectivities
(this aspect is also noted by Staricco, 2016: 6, 9). This second task was undertaken in Parts III and IV (on
the rationale for this sequencing, see Sum and Jessop 2013: 27–8, 233). However, as our past
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regulationist work was more structural (but not structuralist) in orientation and highlighted the emer-
gent, objective features of social relations, we often opted for semiotic entry-points into issues that
we had previously studied mainly from an objective, ‘structurationist’ viewpoint. Regardless of the
chosen entry-point, however, complementary arguments are introduced from the other entry-
point. Our other CPE work pursues the same analytical strategy and, in Jessop’s work, typically high-
lights the foundational, incompressible contradictions at the heart of the capital relation.
This concern with the contradictory nature of the capital relation cannot be airily dismissed, as
Staricco (2016: 9) suggests, as a return to ‘hard political economy à la RA’ that is thereby uninformed
by the CPE approach. This interpretation errs on four grounds. First, while there is a widely acknowl-
edged residual economism in the RA, this does not make it part of hard political economy as we
define it. For us, this ‘fetishizes economic categories, naturalizes economic actions, institutions and
“laws”, and neglects their ties to the wider social formation’ (Sum and Jessop 2013: 176). Second,
we show that the RA does regularly note the role of sense- and meaning-making in the constitution
of accumulation regimes, modes of regulation, and patterns of societalisation, but add that it lacks
the conceptual and theoretical bases for exploring this adequately and consistently rather than
gesturally and in an ad hoc manner (Jessop and Sum 2006a: 376–7, Sum and Jessop 2013: 81–4,
96, 176–7). CPE was explicitly developed to provide this crucial foundation (Table 1).
Third, because capital’s inherent contradictions and crisis-tendencies are correlated with strategic
dilemmas, CPE explores how provisional, unstable, and fragile institutional, spatio-temporal fixes, and
semantic fixes may manage these contradictions and crisis-tendencies for a time. It also notes that
these fixes are linked to economic, political, and social imaginaries that contribute to the institutio-
nalised compromises and accounts of the ‘general interest’ that guide the handling of the associated
strategic dilemmas (e.g. Sum and Jessop 2013: 415–21, and Jessop 2013a, 2013b text cited by Star-
icco, 2016: 3).4
Fourth, the analysis of crises combines structural and semiotic analyses to reveal their objectively
overdetermined, subjectively indeterminate character. Specifically:
The CPE approach combines semiotic and structural analyses to examine: (1) how crises emerge when established
patterns of dealing with structural contradictions, their crisis tendencies and strategic dilemmas no longer work as
expected and, indeed, when continued reliance thereon may even aggravate matters; (2) how contestation over
the meaning of the crisis shapes responses through processes of variation, selection and retention that are
mediated through a mix of semiotic and extra-semiotic mechanisms. (Sum and Jessop 2013: 397)
This approach is explicit in the account of the North Atlantic Financial Crisis as a multiple crisis
presented in Chapter 11 (Sum and Jessop 2013: 395–439) and its roots in the contradictions and
crisis-tendencies of finance-dominated accumulation that can only be temporarily deferred
through institutional and spatio-temporal fixes (Sum and Jessop 2013: 416). Moreover, in other pub-
lished work, ignored by Staricco, we provide CPE accounts of the objectively overdetermined origins
and dynamics of crises (see e.g. Jessop 2002, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2014, Jessop and Sum 2006a, Sum
2011). These complement the focus on construals in the CPE monograph.
Table 1. CPE between soft economic sociology and hard political economy.
Soft economic sociology CPE Hard political economy
Grasps meaningfulness of social relations,
reveals social embedding of economic
relations, and notes performative impact
of semiosis
All social relations have semiotic and
structural moments, each of which
involves analytically distinct practices,
processes, and emergent effects
Grasps distinctiveness of economic
categories, their material referents, and
their structured/structuring role in
wider social formations
Finds it hard to define the specificity of
economic vis-à-vis other relations –
because all are always-already equally
discursive in nature
Complexity reduction via specific
economic categories and imaginaries
is key to observing and organising the
‘actually existing economy’
Reifies economic categories, regards
economic structures as ‘natural’, and
treats agents as passive bearers or
dupes of economic logics
Risk of idealism, defining economic
relations only in terms of their manifest
semiotic content rather than emergent
properties, logics, contradictions, etc.
Economic relations can be studied from
either a semiotic or structural entry-
point but, sooner or later, its other
moment must be integrated
Strong risk of economic determinism,
which explains key processes via ‘iron
laws’ that operate in the economic field
and beyond it
NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 5
The Amsterdam School and class formation
We have praised the Amsterdam School (first labelled as such in print in Jessop 1990a) in Jessop and
Sum (2006a, 2013), Sum and Jessop (2013), and other texts. We endorse its efforts to combine a
Marxist analysis of the circuits of capital with a (neo-)Gramscian analysis of hegemonic strategies,
as well as its consistent focus on issues of agency. We also summarise its key concepts in essentially
the same terms as our current critic (compare Staricco 2016: 10–11, 14–15n, with Jessop and Sum
2006a: 21, 25–6, 93–6, 100ff, Jessop and Sum 2013: 60–2, Sum and Jessop 2013, 80, 84–6, 246).
That he misses this positive evaluation might well result from his careless conflation of our
pointed criticisms of the ‘Italian School’ in international political economy (Sum and Jessop 2013:
72–6),5 with criticisms of the Amsterdam School, which we discuss in another section entirely
(2013: 80–6). The latter school developed its main arguments from other sources in the 1970s,
some years before Robert Cox explicitly laid the foundations for the ‘Italian School’ (Cox 1983); it
also has a superior grasp of both Marx and Gramsci than Cox and his early followers; and it elaborated
a distinctive approach to transnational class formation that, unlike the Italian School, did not just
rescale selected Gramscian concepts from the national to the international level. Besides his mistaken
belief that our criticisms of the Italian School apply to our esteemed Dutch colleagues, Staricco’s criti-
cisms also misfire because, as he himself remarks, CPE deploys very similar concepts while denoting
them with other words. These similarities are also recognised by leading Amsterdam scholars, who
acknowledge the influence of an early paper by Jessop on the same concerns (Jessop 1983) and
note affinities between the two approaches (e.g. Overbeek 1990: 26–8, van der Pijl, 1998: 29, 50,
de Graaff and van Apeldoorn 2011: 425, van Apeldoorn et al. 2012: 473ff). Indeed, protoconcepts
of control can be interpreted as reductions of complexity to guide economic strategies that reflect
the interests of productive and money capital; and comprehensive concepts of control (hereafter
CCCs) can be interpreted, as Amsterdamers themselves note, as hybrid accumulation strategies,
state projects, and hegemonic visions (e.g. Overbeek 1988: 23 and 23n, 1990: 26–8, 2004: 135, van
der Pijl 1989: 33, 2006: 31).
Amsterdam scholars also note that economic imaginaries have a crucial constitutive role in class
formation. Van der Pijl discusses class formation in terms of ‘transnational imagined communities’,
drawing an analogy with Benedict Anderson’s account of nation formation (van der Pijl 1998: 98,
cf. Anderson 1983). Moreover, as Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, a leading second-generation Amsterdam
scholar, observed:
… to constitute themselves as a class, capitalists somehow have to ‘discover’ their common interests and con-
struct a shared outlook and identity that transcends the narrow view of their position as individual and competing
capitalists. The moment of class agency – or the process of class formation is thus always a political process in
which capitalists transcend the logic of market competition and reach a temporary unity of strategic orientation
and purpose, enabling them to articulate (vis-à-vis other social classes or groups, as well as vis-à-vis the state) a
‘general capitalist interest’.… [M]embers of a class have to imagine themselves as part of a wider (possibly trans-
national) community in order to constitute themselves as a class actor. (van Apeldoorn 2004: 155)
This puts sense- and meaning-making at the heart of Amsterdam analyses as an integral element of
class formation. This makes it vulnerable to Staricco’s fourth criticism of CPE, namely, the culturalist
bias shown in stressing the constitutive role of economic imaginaries in the emergence and conso-
lidation of social forces and economic regimes. And, if one attempted to defend the Amsterdam
School against this criticism by saying that, in contrast with nations, class imaginaries can only inter-
pellate classes as active social forces when there are corresponding objective social relations of pro-
duction, this defense also holds for CPE. Moreover, given the complexities of class relations and,
especially for the Amsterdam School, the various functional, institutional, departmental,6 reliance
on absolute or relative surplus-value, sociospatial, generational, and even more historically speciﬁc
bases for identifying distinct capital fractions and broader bourgeois fractions (e.g. Bode 1979: 18–
21, van der Pijl 1984, Overbeek 1988: 22–3), it follows that different kinds of class identity and
action can emerge based on different imagined communities of fractional and class interests. This
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reinforces the argument for the performative role of semiosis. The same points are also found, of
course, in Marx’s distinction between class against capital and class for itself, his analysis of class
forces in the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, and many other texts (Marx 1976, Edwards
1983). Gramsci provides an even more nuanced analysis of class formation (Gramsci 1971, see also
Portelli 1972).
Furthermore, CCCs are articulated by politicians, political pundits, trade union leaders, central
bankers, experts, parties, think tanks, lobbies, intellectuals, diplomats, leading industrialists, bureau-
crats, and diverse other social agents across quite different social fields, geographical scales, and sites
of struggle; their capacity to become hegemonic for a while in ‘the political business cycle’ also
depends on finding ways to disguise a specific, asymmetrical conception of the general capitalist
interest as a general social interest (cf. Bode 1979: 20, Overbeek 1990: 16–20, 25–9, 45, van der Pijl
1984: passim, 1998: 4–5). It follows that to decipher their objective significance for class formation
that lies beneath or behind their ideational representations requires careful evaluation of their
class relevance and class appeal in specific conjunctures and horizons of action (Bode 1979: 19–
23, van der Pijl 1984, Overbeek 1990, van Apeldoorn 2002, Sum and Jessop 2013: 79, 187–90). This
demands spatio-temporally nuanced analysis of relatively stable structures, changing conjunctures,
the balance of forces, and successive offensive and defensive steps in the struggles between
capital fractions and between the bourgeoisie and subaltern classes (the last theme is prominent
in van der Pijl 1984 and emphasised by Jessop and Sum 2013). In short, this underlines the impor-
tance of exploring the dialectic of objective overdetermination and subjective indeterminacy at
the heart of both the Amsterdam and CPE approaches.
Further, as van der Pijl argues, CCCs ‘seek to attract mass support and can become hegemonic
where they combine mutually compatible blueprints for handling relations among various fractions
of capital and for conducting labour relations’ (1984: 31ff). Success depends on the contingent ‘cor-
respondence between the objective state of capitalist society and the particular solution proposed by
a single class-fraction’ (van der Pijl 1984: 33–34). This is ‘closer to the overall, “systemic” requirements
of the mode of production, and thus are propelled into the foreground as microcosmic prototypes of
the configuration towards which the entire mode of production should move’ (van der Pijl 1984: 33).
Elsewhere he discusses structural affinities and structural coupling (2006: 35, 50) and distinguishes
hegemonic CCCs from ‘revolutionary myths’ that lacked internal logic and a social base (1989: 30).
Such arguments make the Amsterdam approach vulnerable to Staricco’s sixth criticism since,
given CCCs’ performative nature, it is only ex post that their hegemonic potential can be established.
For, whether this potential is realised, depends on a correct reading by social forces of what exists in
potentia and could be created through appropriate strategies and structural changes reflecting the
conjuncture and balance of forces (Jessop 1990a, 1990b, 2015, Jessop and Sum 2006a, Sum and
Jessop 2013).
CPE aims to provide the conceptual toolkit needed to understand these specificities and the polys-
emy of economic and other social imaginaries. It argues that the effects of semiosis can no more be
explained purely in semiotic terms than the effects of structuration are explicable solely through its
direct impact on possible combinations and sequences of action. Knowing that ideas matter is quite
different from being able to provide robust explanations of the underlying semiotic mechanisms and
processes that lead to the selection and retention of some ideas over others. This can easily lead to
essentialism or ad hocery in the requisite analyses. The Amsterdam School avoids this by mobilising
some familiar Gramscian concepts, but rarely translates these into detailed analyses of the contingen-
cies of the uneven covariation, co-selection, and co-retention that occur in the semiotic and structural
fields (Jessop and Sum 2013: 70) or of the relative weight of semiosis and materiality in the selection
and retention of CCCs (or other imaginaries). It is quite clear that Amsterdam scholars recognise that
there are many rival traditions, orientations, conceptions of the world, experiments, strategies, pro-
jects, and policies and that not all succeed. There is a risk that they work backwards from those
that succeed to explain their conditions of success (cf. Laclau and Mouffe 1985 on hegemony)
without explaining why potential projects fail. However, since it identifies rival protoconcepts of
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control, diverse rival interpretations of the two protoconcepts, and several rival CCCs, it is important
to explain why some of these get selected and retained and can provide the basis for new accumu-
lation regimes and modes of regulation at one or more scales of political economic organisation.
However, a typical Amsterdam School analysis provides a dense historical account of the succession
of hegemonic CCCs and their eventual decomposition, relies more on a detailed narrative account of
rival strategies and policies (including their repurposing), and draws on the analysis of interpersonal
networks, corporate ties, and material interdependencies to justify the attribution of class relevance
to CCCs and their social bases. This reflects its focus on class relations, interests, and strategies. It does
not provide a critical semiotic analysis of why some CCCs, strategies, and policies prove more success-
ful – nor is this a core part of the Amsterdam Project. This is one area where CPE (as opposed to
Anglo-Saxon cultural studies) could contribute to the development of the Amsterdam School.
On CPE and the Amsterdam School
We have highlighted some significant similarities between CPE and key Amsterdam School analyses
to reveal the critical failings of Staricco’s assessments of both theoretical frameworks. We now con-
sider some important theoretical and methodological differences between them and indicate where
and how they might complement each other. Because there is no direct parallel in the Amsterdam
Project, this comparison does not extend to the ambitious ‘grand theoretical’ aspects of the CPE
approach. It is, therefore, limited to their respective contributions to the critique of political
economy and, in this regard, focuses on the key theoretical issues, concepts, and methods in the
two research programmes (see Table 2).
Both approaches rest on a critical realist meta-theoretical understanding of the tasks of theory
building, adopt similar readings of Marx’s contributions to the critique of political economy, and
share the regulationist concern to explain the improbable reproduction of the capital relation (Over-
beek 2000). They differ in their principal concern within this common framework. Whereas CPE starts
with the general regulationist problematic, the core texts of the Amsterdam School focus on the
improbable integration of the circuits of capital. This is reflected in different entry-points – which
does not exclude convergence at later stages in the analysis. Specifically, the Amsterdam Approach,
as Staricco rightly notes, is concerned with class formation, class projects, and class struggle; conver-
sely, as we employ it, the CPE approach inclines to a capital-theoretical entry-point. While these start-
ing points reflect political and epistemological choices, they are potentially compatible in theoretical
terms. Indeed, a key aim of the strategic-relational approach developed in Jessop’s state-theoretical
work and applied more generally in CPE was to overcome the class- versus capital-theoretical divide
(see Jessop 1982, 1985, 1990b, Jessop and Sum 2006a: 328–33, Sum and Jessop 2013: 48–54).
Nonetheless, in these instances, different entry-points are associated with different conceptions of
the global horizon of analysis and, equally significantly, with different sets of core theoretical con-
cepts. Consistent with its class-theoretical orientation, the Amsterdam School tends to explore the
global economy in terms of rival transnational class alliances associated with different CCCs and
has developed a corresponding set of core theoretical concepts concerned with different aspects
of class formation (see especially van der Pijl 1984, Overbeek 1990, 2004, van Apeldoorn 2002). In
contrast, the CPE approach analyses the world market in terms of a fractally organised, variegated
capitalism organised in the shadow of a dominant variety of capitalism – with possible variations
in this regard depending on the local, regional, national, continental, or global scale of analysis –
and has also developed a more form- or capital-theoretical set of concepts to analyse the institutional
and spatio-temporal fixes that help to stabilise, for a time, specific regimes of accumulation and
modes of regulation within a variegated capitalist world market (see especially Jessop and Sum
2006a, Jessop 2013b, Sum and Jessop 2013). These contrasting concerns are also reflected in the sec-
ondary concepts used to refine these analyses. The Amsterdam School offers sophisticated analyses
of the state–capital nexus, the changing articulation of geoeconomics and geopolitics, the dynamics
of the interstate system (with a division between a liberal Lockean heartland in the global north and a
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series of Hobbesian contender states outside the heartland), and a strong interest in imperialism and
the role of force in maintaining or contesting international hegemony and domination (see the work
of van der Pijl).
Reflecting these different theoretical concerns, there is a corresponding variation in research
methods. The Amsterdam School provides much more detailed historical analyses, drawing on rel-
evant historical and contemporary sources, providing thickly descriptive strategic and narrative
policy analyses oriented to class formation, and uses network analysis to map the connections
within and across different fractions of capital. With its more form-analytical approach, CPE to date
is more inclined to ideal typical thought-experiments oriented to its specific theoretical concerns
and rendered plausible by selective appropriation of secondary texts. However, Ngai-Ling Sum’s
case studies also rely heavily on the documentary analysis of changing imaginaries, governmental
technologies, and the difference that specific agents can make.
We discussed above the different types of agential analysis in the two approaches and include
them in Table 2 for the sake of completeness. These differences reflect the principal concerns of
the two approaches, but, as also noted above, both projects are sensitive to the discursive-material
interactions at work in subject formation. The common influence of Gramsci’s pioneering analyses of




Improbable interscalar integration of the circuits of
capital
Improbable régulation-reproduction of the capital
relation as a whole
Entry-point Integral class-theoretical analysis of rival concepts of
control tied to the positions and interests of
differently conceived and constructed fractions in
multi-scalar circuits of capital
Integral capital-theoretical analysis starting from
semiosis (accumulation strategies) and then
integrating structuration (institutional and spatio-
temporal fixes), or vice versa
Analytical
horizon
Transnational class formation in a world market
structured through a dominant CCC that reflects the
interests of one capital fraction and wins support
from other fractions and subalterns
Variegated capitalism in a world market organised in
the shadow of a dominant variety of capitalism that
shapes scope for other regional economic spaces
and varieties of capitalism to engage in
accumulation
Key concepts Circuits of capital, fractions of capital, productive and
money protoconcepts of control, synthetic CCCs,
variations in the capital–labour relation
Form analysis of capital relation, structural
contradictions and strategic dilemmas, economic
and political imaginaries, accumulation strategies,
state projects, and hegemonic visions
Secondary
concepts
Capital–state nexus; articulation of geoeconomics and
geopolitics; Lockean heartland versus Hobbesian
periphery; imperialism, militarism
Institutional, spatio-temporal, and semantic fixes;
institutionalised class compromise; disjunction
between the world market and the world of states
Methods . Network analysis to identify principal capital
fractions in a given period
. Narrative strategic and policy analysis oriented to
class formation
. Historical analysis of key events or crises that
confirm or reorient hegemony of capital fraction
. Form analysis to identify principal contradictions in
a given period
. Analysis of institutional, spatio-temporal, and
semantic fixes
. Variation, selection, and retention of imaginaries
and/or institutional and spatio-temporal fixes
Primary agents Rival fractions of capital, their allies, and intellectual
supports oriented to imagined communities of
interest
Class-relevant social forces, identified in terms of
effects of pursuit of their specific projects in given
conjunctures
Class struggle Alternation of periods of bourgeois offensive
(oriented to hegemony) and of bourgeois defense
(resort to force)
Changing conjunctural mixes of offensive and
defensive strategies, offensive and defensive tactics
Periodisation . Interwoven temporalities, including la longue
durée, long waves, short-term cycles, specific
conjunctures
. Historical succession of hegemonic CCCs and
associated struggles plus their effects in
interscalar relations
. Changing articulation of continuities and
discontinuities considered at different macro–
micro scales
. Strategic-relational focus on periods, phases, and




Exhaustion of an extensive or intensive accumulation
regime
Changes that undermine fixes and lead to crises of
crisis management
Failure of the hegemonic CCC to maintain unity of the
dominant class
Political, ideological, and hegemonic crises in wider
social formation
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hegemony leads to similar approaches to the analysis of the modalities of class struggle with alter-
nating phases of offensive and defensive moments in different conjunctures. The long-run perspec-
tive of the Amsterdam School sometimes leads to rich analyses of the interweaving of processes with
different temporal rhythms as its aficionados explore the contested succession of rival CCCs in differ-
ent phases of capitalist development and/or in different economic and political spaces. Reflecting its
embedding in the strategic-relational approach and its wide-ranging theoretical interests, CPE offers
some general principles of periodisation but then develops specific periodisations for specific expla-
nanda. This is illustrated in Jessop’s analysis of types of neo-liberalism and their different phases
(Jessop 2012a). Finally, we compare early Amsterdam work on the genesis of economic crises and
early regulation-theoretical CPE analyses of accumulation and regulation crises. Thus, whereas
early Amsterdam work explored the historical conditions that led to the exhaustion of extensive
and intensive accumulation regimes in specific transnational conjunctures, early CPE work focused
on the breakdown of institutional and spatio-temporal fixes. Subsequent work in both approaches
has elaborated more complex-concrete analyses that provide more detailed, multidimensional
analyses.
Conclusions
The ‘essential coherence’ of our CPE project is best understood by locating it ‘in the whole develop-
ment of [our] multiform intellectual work’, especially as presented in the three books that summarise
our major contributions to the critique of political economy (Jessop 1990b, Jessop and Sum 2006a,
Sum and Jessop 2013). While each book has its own substantive focus, they are all informed by critical
realism, the strategic-relational approach, and interest in struggles for hegemony. Moreover, as a
synthesising project, CPE builds on, and aims to transcend, state theory, the RA, and critical discourse
analysis (Jessop and Sum 2006a: 52–3, 376–9, Jessop and Sum 2013: 21–2). During its development,
CPE has displayed an increasing consolidation of stable and permanent elements that cohere around
taking semiosis and structuration as the co-constitutive foundational processes of social order and
exploring their mediation and overdetermination through technological and agential selectivities.
Depending on the theoretical object of a CPE analysis, the entry-point may be more structural or
more semiotic – but this never obviates the need to analyse the contingent interactions of both
aspects. This explains why there are significant convergences between the CPE and Amsterdam
Projects.
Nonetheless, as we endeavoured to show briefly in the preceding section of our response to Star-
icco, there are also significant differences in how they have contributed to the critique of political
economy. On the one hand, adherents of the Amsterdam School focus on how class formation is
shaped by competing concepts of control and they explain historical development primarily in
terms of narrative strategic analysis organised around a fractional account of capital accumulation,
informed by some central Gramscian concepts, and, in the case of van der Pijl, linked to the distinc-
tion between liberal Lockean heartlands and authoritarian Hobbesian peripheries. On the other hand,
the CPE project adopts a more form-analytical, capital-theoretical entry-point and explores the insti-
tutional, spatio-temporal, and semantic fixes that permit relatively stable accumulation despite the
contradictions and crisis-tendencies of the capital relation. It also studies the disruptive impact of
objectively overdetermined, subjectively indeterminate crises and the struggles to construe them.
In short, the Amsterdam Project and CPE offer different ways to explore the dynamics of differential
accumulation and its embedding in wider sets of social relations. One approach cannot be judged
superior to the other in all or even most respects because each has its own distinctive concerns, con-
ceptual tools, special research methods, and so forth. They also have enough in common meta-theor-
etically and theoretically that, while these distinctions make a difference, they do not create an
unbridgeable divide between the two approaches. This has been recognised by both sides. For
our part, we believe that an integral analysis must include and seek to integrate both entry-points
along with others that shed light on the past, present, and future of social formations dominated
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by competing logics and projects of capital accumulation. This kind of analysis requires a careful
approach to critique that respects Gramsci’s guidelines and aims to put different theoretical traditions
in their rightful place.
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Notes
1. For references to the article by Staricco, we are using the page numbers from the “first on-line” version.
2. While the earliest work in the Parisian school focused on the American and French economies, later work moved
well beyond a national focus (e.g. Aglietta 1982, Lipietz 1987; for further discussion, see Jessop and Sum 2006a:
29–30, 219, 232–3).
3. For example, Staricco claims (2016: 3) that we criticise ‘the entire regulationist constellation, and not just the Par-
isian School,… for giving a major weight to economic categories, institutions and their social embeddedness
over processes of meaning-making, discursive strategies or, more generally, cultural and ideological categories’
(Jessop and Sum 2013: 61–2). No such statement occurs anywhere in this text; at best, Staricco is offering a weak
summary-cum-paraphrase of several passages. Moreover, rather than supporting Staricco’s claim, the cited pages
identify Parisian interest in cultural themes and methods and praise the Amsterdam school for anticipating CPE!
4. Similar ideas about dilemmas are found in some Amsterdam work, either explicitly (e.g. Overbeek 1990: 26–7, on
dilemmas around the contradictory nature of the wage relation) or implicitly in terms of how different protocon-
cepts of control and CCCs privilege one or other moment in the circuit capital until this creates imbalances.
5. See in more detail Jessop and Sum (2006b: 160–3).
6. The reference here is to Marx’s distinction between Department I (capital goods) and Department II (consumer
goods) (see Overbeek 1988: 22). Bode also discusses Department III (luxury goods, armaments, etc.) (see Bode
1979: 18).
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